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Abstract
The statistical tools of Complex Network Analysis are of great use to understand salient properties of
complex systems, may these be natural or pertaining human engineered infrastructures. One of these that
is receiving growing attention for its societal relevance is that of electricity distribution. In this paper, we
present a survey of the most important scientific studies investigating the properties of several Power Grids
infrastructures using Complex Network Analysis techniques and methodologies. We categorize and explore
the most relevant literature works considering general topological properties, differences between the various
graph-related indicators and reliability aspects.
1 Introduction
Complex Network Analysis (CNA) is a relatively young field of research. The first systematic studies appeared
in the late 1990s [1, 2, 3, 4] having the goal of studying the properties of large networks that behave as complex
systems. The research owes a great deal of its foundations to the seminal work on Random Graphs of Erdo˝s and
Re´nyi [5, 6] who studied asymptotic properties of stochastic graph processes. Complex Network Analysis has been
used in many different fields of knowledge, from biology [7] to chemistry [8], from linguistics to social sciences [9],
from telephone call patterns [10] to computer networks [11] and web [12, 13] to virus spreading [14, 15, 16] to
logistics [17, 18, 19] and also inter-banking systems [20]. Men-made infrastructures are especially interesting to
study under the Complex Network Analysis lenses, especially when they are large scale and grow in a decentralized
and independent fashion, thus not the result of a global, but rather of many local autonomous designs. The Power
Grid is a prominent example. But what do we mean by Power Grid in the context of the present treatment?
We focus on the electricity transmission and distribution Power Grid as it is essential for today’s society
as an enabling infrastructure, but also its efficiency and working has major consequences, among other things,
for the environment. Blackouts seem to have a special role in reminding us of the importance of the Grid and
how much we give its availability for granted. From the technological point of view, the electrical system and
Power Grid involve many scientific knowledge areas that contribute to the design, operations and analysis of
power systems: Physics (electromagnetism, classical mechanics), Electrical engineering (AC circuits and phasors,
3-phase networks, electrical systems control theory) and Mathematics (linear algebra, differential equations).
Traditional studies tend to have a “local” view of the Grid, e.g., defining how to design a transformer and
predicting its functioning. Typically, studies tend to focus on the physical and electrical properties (e.g., [21]), or
the characteristics of the Power Grid as a complex dynamical system [22], or again, the control theory aspects [23].
The move from a “local” to a “global” view of the Power Grid as a complex system is possible by resorting to
Complex Network Analysis and statistical graph theory.
The goal of the present treatment is to provide a survey and compare the most well-known scientific studies
conducted using Complex Network Analysis techniques concerning Power Grid systems. We consider several
parameters to assess the differences between the various studies and try to enucleate the most important aspects
of each study. We start by introducing the methods and metrics that are evaluated in this work (Section 2); the
section contains the basic definitions and simple examples in order to establish a common background. Section 3
provides the main characteristics of all the studies. The actual comparison of these using CNA metrics are
reported and discussed in Section 4 which also provides a conclusion to the paper.
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2 Background and Survey Methodology
Before going further analyzing the various studies in detail, some common definitions need to be stated in order
to have a common ground. The essential concepts from the graph theory are also given to provide a common
basis. For each graph property described, a concrete example on a small graph, as shown in Figure 1, is provided
to better understand property’s application.
Figure 1: A simple graph.
As described in Section 1, all the works that are examined in the present manuscript consider the Power Grid
networks as graphs following the mathematical meaning of the term.
Definition 1 (Graph). A graph G is a pair of sets G(V,E) where V is the set of vertexes and E is the set edges.
An edge ei,j is a pair of vertexes (vi, vj). If (vi, vj) ∈ E then vi and vj are said to be adjacent or neighboring
and are called end-vertexes of the edge.
Considering the Power Grid, the sets composing the graph assume particular interest from an operational and
physical point of view. The physical components of the Power Grid assume a meaning in the theoretical repre-
sentation of the Power Grid as a graph according the following interpretation.
Definition 2 (Power Grid graph). A Power Grid graph is a graph G(V,E) such that each element vi ∈ V is
either a substation, transformer, or consuming unit of a physical Power Grid. There is an edge ei,j = (vi, vj) ∈ E
between two nodes if there is a physical cable connecting directly the elements represented by vi and vj.
Therefore, following the properties of the graphs is an interesting first way of categorizing the Power Grid
under analysis. In particular, distinctions can be made regarding the order and size of the graph. Order is the
number of vertexes composing the graph, while size is the number of edges in the same graph. More formally:
Definition 3 (Order and size of a graph). Given the graph G the order is given by N = |V |, while the size is
given by M = |E|.
Example:
The graph G shown in Figure 1 is characterized by the set of vertexes V :
V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
and by the set of edges E:
E = {(1, 2), (1, 5), (2, 3), (2, 5), (3, 4)}
the order and size of G are |V | = 5 and |E| = 5 respectively.
An important property that characterizes a vertex of a graph is the degree, that is the number of vertexes the
node is adjacent to. More formally, this quantity is defined as:
Definition 4 (Neighborhood and degree). The set of vertexes adjacent to a vertex v ∈ V represents the neigh-
borhood of v that is denoted by Γv. The degree of v is d(v) = |Γv|.
From order and size it is possible to have a global value for the connectivity of the vertexes of the graph,
known as average node degree . That is <k>= 2MN .
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Example:
The neighborhood of vertex 1 in Figure 1 is:
Γ(1) = {2, 5}
its degree is:
d(1) = |Γ(1)| = 2
The average node degree for G is:
<k>=
2 · 5
5
= 2
Usually, it is not essential to have the specific information regarding the node degree of only a certain node or
the average degree. It is more interesting understand the the overall characteristics of a graph considering its
statistical measures. In particular, one measure is the node degree probability distribution. More formally,
Definition 5 (Node degree distribution). Consider the degree k of a node in a graph as a random variable, the
function
Nk = {v ∈ G : d(v) = k}
is called probability node degree distribution.
The shape of the distribution is a salient characteristic of the network. For the Power Grid, the shape is typically
either exponential or a Power-law. More precisely, an exponential node degree (k) distribution has a fast decay
in the probability of having nodes with relative high node degree. It follows the relation:
P (k) = αeβk
where α and β are parameters of the specific network considered. While a Power-law distribution has a slower
decay with higher probability of having nodes with high node degree. It is expressed by the relation:
P (k) = αk−γ
where α and γ are parameters of the specific network considered. We remark that the graphs considered in the
Power Grid domain are usually large, although finite, in terms of order and size thus providing limited and finite
probability distributions.
The node degree distribution gives some information about the static situation of the network, but it does
not give any information about the paths that can be followed in the graph to move from one node to another.
To investigate properties dealing with paths between nodes, that for a Power Grid graph are important to assess
which nodes have to sustain the highest flow of energy, some further concepts are essential.
The concepts of path and path length are crucial to understand the way two vertexes are connected.
Definition 6 (Path and path length). A path of G is a subgraph P of the form:
V (P ) = {x0, x1, . . . , xl}, E(P ) = {(x0, x1), (x1, x2), . . . , (xl−1, xl)}.
such that V (P ) ⊆ V and E(P ) ⊆ E. The vertexes x0 and xl are end-vertexes of P and l = |E(P )| is the length
of P . A graph is connected if for any two distinct vertexes vi, vj ∈ V there is a finite path from vi to vj.
Definition 7 (Distance). Given a graph G and vertexes vi and vj, their distance d(vi, vj) is the minimal length
of any vi − vj path in the graph. If there is no vi − vj path then it is conventionally set to d(vi, vj) =∞.
Definition 8 (Shortest path). Given a graph G and vertexes vi and vj the shortest path is the the path corre-
sponding to the minimum of to the set {|P1|, |P2|, . . . , |Pk|} containing the lengths of all paths for which vi and
vj are the end-vertexes.
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Example:
Example of paths between vertex 1 and vertex 4 are:
P1,4 = {1− 2− 3− 4}
whose length lP = 3 but also:
P
′
1,4 = {1− 5− 2− 3− 4}
is a valid path whose length lP ′ = 4, therefore the shortest path between vertex
1 and vertex 4 is P1,4.
The distance between vertex 1 and vertex 4 is:
d(1, 4) = 3
while distance between vertex 1 and vertex 5 is:
d(1, 5) = 1
To describe the importance of a node with respect to minimal paths in the graph, the concept of betweenness
helps. Betweenness (sometimes also referred as load) for a given vertex is the number of shortest paths between
any other nodes that traverse it. More formally,
Definition 9 (Betweenness). The betweenness b(v) of vertex v ∈ V is
b(v) =
∑
v 6=s,t
σst(v)
where σst(v) is 1 if the shortest path between vertex s and vertex t goes through vertex v, 0 otherwise.
Example:
Vertex 2 is involved in the following shortest paths:
P1,3, P1,4, P3,1, P3,5, P4,1, P4,5, P5,3, P5,4
therefore betweenness of vertex 2 is:
b(2) = 8
In the Power Grid domain however it is not always true that most central node are the most important nodes for
the Grid since they have to sustain the most number of shortest paths. It is not a priori true that the nodes that
sustain the greatest electricity flow between two nodes in a real Power Grid are the one with highest betweenness
since electricity flow could not follow the topological shortest path. Although it is important to know what is
the betweenness of the most important nodes, to shift from a local to a global graph measure it is also useful to
have a high level picture of the state of betweenness for the whole graph. A statistic measure is then used:
Definition 10 (Betweenness distribution). Consider the betweenness value l of a node in a graph as a random
variable, the function
Lk = {v ∈ G : b(v) = l}
is called betweenness probability distribution of the graph G.
Another distinction that is available between graphs is their characterization as unweighted (as considered in
Definition 1) or weighted. The edges are not always the same, in fact, different importance can be associated to
them considering their role in the network or physical properties connecting vertexes. From a formal point of
view:
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Definition 11 (Weighted graph). A weighted graph is a pair G(V,E) where V is the set of vertexes and E is
the set of edges. An edge ei,j,w = (vi, vj , w) is a triple where vi, vj ∈ V and w ∈ R. w is called weight of the
edge.
Example:
Figure 2 represents a weighted graph: each edge is characterized by a cer-
tain weight. The weight associated to the edge might be related to physical
properties of the links (e.g., resistance of the cables in a Power Grid network)
connecting the objects represented as vertexes in the graph.
Figure 2: A weighted graph.
Specific properties of a graph are best understood by resorting to the matricial counterparts, in particular, to
the Adjacency matrix and Laplacian matrix graph representations.
Definition 12 (Adjacency matrix). The adjacency matrix A = A(G) = (ai,j) of a graph G of order N is the
N ×N matrix given by
aij =
{
1 if (vi, vj) ∈ E,
0 otherwise.
Definition 13 (Laplacian matrix). Let D = (Dij) be the N ×N diagonal matrix with Dii = d(vi) the degree of
vi in G and A the adjacency matrix of G.
The matrix L = D −A is the Laplacian matrix of graph G.
Example:
The Adjacency matrix for graph G is:
A(G) =


0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0


The Laplacian matrix for graph G is:
L(G) =


2 −1 0 0 −1
−1 3 −1 0 −1
0 −1 2 −1 0
0 0 −1 1 0
−1 −1 0 0 2


Another interesting property that is investigated for networks and graphs is the so called small-world property.
Although a complete coverage of the small-world problem is beyond the scope of the present work, we recall the
basic definitions and refer to [1, 24]. We begin with the clustering coefficient.
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Definition 14 (Clustering coefficient). The clustering coefficient of a node v is
γv =
|E(Γv)|(
kv
2
)
where |E(Γv)| is the number of edges in the neighborhood of v and
(
kv
2
)
is the total number of possible edges in
Γv. The clustering coefficient of graph G is γ, the average value of the clustering coefficient of all nodes of the
graph.
Definition 15 (Characteristic path length). Let vi ∈ V be a vertex in graph G, the characteristic path length
for G, LCP is the median of dvi where:
dvi =
1
(N − 1)
∑
i6=j
d(vi, vj)
is the mean of the distances connecting vi to any other vertex vj in G whose order is N .
Example:
The clustering coefficient for vertex 1 is:
γ1 = 1
while for the entire graph it is the average of {γ1 = 1, γ2 =
1
3
, γ3 = 0, γ4 =
0, γ5 = 1} that is:
γG = 0.467
The characteristic path length is the median of
{dv1 =
7
4
, dv2 =
5
4
, dv3 =
6
4
, dv4 =
9
4
, dv5 =
7
4
}
that is:
LCP =
7
4
= 1.75
Definition 16 (Random Graph). A graph G(V,E) of a given size is a random graph if it is the result of a
random process where the edges between any two nodes have been chosen independently with probability p ∈ [0, 1]
among all possible
(
N
2
)
edges.
We remark that there exist several definitions of random graphs as provided by Erdo˝s and Re´nyi [6], Bollobas [25]
or Durrett [26]. These mostly lead anyhow to the same asymptotic properties. This holds also for the clustering
coefficient e.g. [27] which differs from the definition we proposed (in line with Watts and Strogatz in [1] and
Watts in [24]).
Small-world networks (SW), proposed by Watts and Strogatz in [1], own two important properties at the same
time: the characteristic path length is close in value to the one of a random graph (RG) (CPLSW ≈ CPLRG)
and they have a much higher clustering coefficient (CCSW ≫ CCRG). Small-worlds are a better model than
random graphs for social networks and other phenomena [9, 28, 29, 30] and thus a model to keep in mind for the
Power Grid, too.
Another investigation usually performed when analyzing Power Grid and that is almost always the motivation
that drives Complex Network Analysis studies related to electrical infrastructures is the investigation of reliability.
Usually, the investigation involves evaluating the disruption behavior of the graph when its nodes or edges are
removed. There are basically two ways to perform this analysis: choosing the nodes to be removed randomly
or selecting the nodes following a certain property or metric significant for the network. Commonly the metric
used to remove nodes follows the highest degree or highest betweenness to simulate targeted attacks that focus
on specific nodes with certain properties or importance for the network.
Other terms to compare the various Power Grid studies involve more general characteristics of the network
under analysis. In particular, the geographical location of the analyzed Grid is responsible for topological
properties due to the different morphological characteristics of different countries. Another relevant aspect deals
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Figure 3: Organization of the Power Grid layers.
with the layer of the Power Grid under investigation since differences can emerge from a topological perspective
investigating the different ends in which the Grid is usually partitioned: High, Medium and Low Voltage. An
example on how the Power Grid is organized is shown in Figure 3. It is also important to have information if
the type of Power Grid graph under analysis comes from a real network infrastructure or it is a synthetic sample
extracted from blueprint models for the Power Grid such as the Bus models of IEEE.
The motivations to include the works in this survey are based on the quality of the research performed,
the rigor in the application of Complex Network Analysis methodologies and the geography of the Power Grid
analyzed in order to cover a broad spectrum of the infrastructure realized in the different countries and identify
possible differences.
3 The Power Grid as a Complex Network
Complex network analysis studies are becoming more and more popular given the amount of natural and human
complex systems. The Power Grid is clearly amenable to such studies and a number of these have been performed
on the High Voltage Grid. Here we describe the most important aspects of each work under investigation. In
particular, the works that are considered in this review are: [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 24, 40, 41, 42,
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62]. These have been chosen based on
the following factors: they are specifically about the Power Grid, they cover US, European, Chinese Grids or
synthetic topologies of electrical engineering literature, they have samples of different sizes and, most importantly,
these are the best-known and most representative works on the topic of CNA and Power Grid.
3.1 Basic Power Grid characteristics
The aspects considered in this first basic assessment of the studies take into account general and non-technical
aspects so to give a global idea of the Grid considered, see Table 1. Several aspects of comparison are considered:
the number of nodes and lines composing the Grid (second and third column); the type of sample considered
either a real Grid or synthetic samples, for instance, coming from IEEE literature such as IEEE Bus systems
(fourth column); the type of Grid analyzed (fifth column) in belonging either to the transmission part (High
Voltage) or to the distribution part (Medium and Low Voltage); another essential information deals with the
geography of the Grid (last column).
Albert et al. [31] study the reliability aspects of the United States Power Grid. They build a graph based on
the information of the POWERmap system (developed by Platts company) consisting of 14099 nodes representing
power plants and substations and 19657 edges representing High Voltage lines (115-765 kV). This same Power
1The values for nodes and lines in this table refer only to a snapshot of Shanghai Power Grid
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Work Number of Number of Sample Network Geography
Nodes Lines Type Type
[31] ∼14000 ∼19600 Real HV North America
[32] ∼300 ∼500 Real HV Italy
[33] ∼314000 N.A. Real HV North America
[34] ∼4800 ∼5500 Real HV Scandinavia
[35] ∼2700 ∼3300 Real HV Europe
[36] ∼3000 ∼3800 Real HV Europe
[37] ∼3000 ∼3800 Real HV Europe
[38] ∼370 ∼570 Real HV Italy, France
and Spain
[39] ∼370 ∼570 Real HV Italy, France
and Spain
[24] ∼4900 ∼6600 Real HV Western US
[63] ∼8500 ∼13900 Synthetic HV Western US and
and real New York State Area
[40] ∼4850 ∼5300 Real MV/LV Netherlands
[41]1 ∼210 ∼320 Synthetic HV China
and real
[42] N.A. N.A. Real HV Europe
[43] 300 411 Synthetic HV
[44] ∼6400 ∼8700 Synthetic HV North America,
and real Scandinavia and Korea
[45] 300 411 Synthetic HV
[46] ∼8500 ∼13900 Synthetic HV Western US and
and real New York State Area
[47] ∼30 ∼13900 Synthetic HV Western US and
and real New York State Area
[48] ∼900 ∼1150 Real HV China
[49] ∼3200 ∼7000 Synthetic HV New York State Area
and real
[50] ∼4900 ∼6600 Real HV Western US
[51] ∼1700 ∼1800 Real HV China
[52] ∼39 ∼46 Syntethic HV
[53] ∼39 ∼46 Syntethic HV
[54] ∼2500 ∼2900 Real HV China
[55] ∼15400 ∼18400 Real HV North America and China
[56] ∼550 ∼800 Synthetic HV
[57] ∼14000 ∼19600 Real HV North America
[58] ∼90 ∼120 Synthetic HV
[59] ∼550 ∼700 Synthetic HV Italy
and real
[60] ∼29500 ∼50000 Synthetic HV North America
and real
[61] ∼400 ∼700 Synthetic
[62] ∼900 ∼1300 Synthetic HV South-East US
and real
[64] ∼60 ∼110 Real HV India
Table 1: Comparison between studies using CNA for the Power Grid.
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Grid sample is used also in the study by Kinney et al. [57] where the reliability of the Grid is analyzed with a
different set of metric compared to those used by Albert et al..
Crucitti et al. [32] analyze the Italian High Voltage Power Grid from a topological perspective. They build a
model based on data from GRTN (the Italian Grid manager at that time) consisting of 341 substations (nodes)
and 517 transmission lines (edges) belonging to the High Voltage segment (220-380 kV).
Chassin et al. [33] analyze the North American Power Grid. They treat the North American Grid as composed
by two different networks, i.e., the Eastern Grid and the Western Grid, that are analyzed separately. This
assumption is justified by the authors by the presence of a small linking between the two Grids (this is realized
on purpose to avoid the spreading of blackouts across the entire country) realized in direct current technology.
In addition, the data they use contain much more nodes and links (almost 236000 nodes for the Eastern and
more than 78000 for the Western Grid, and it is based on the estimations of typical load and maximal capacity
of distribution electrical feeders); data come form Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) and North
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), respectively.
Holmgren [34] analyzes the Nordic Power Grid involving the High Voltage Grids of Sweden, Finland, Norway,
and the main part of Denmark which give an overall graph composed by almost 4800 nodes and more than 5500
edges. The author compares the Nordic network with the Western U.S. Power Grid.
Casals et al. [35] analyze the whole European Power Grid and try to extract non-topological reliability
measures investigating the topological properties of the network. The Power Grid analyzed is the High Voltage
end composed of almost 2800 nodes that span across all European continent. Casals et al. [36] consider the High
Voltage Grids of many European countries analyzing them together and as separate entities having an overall
sample of more than 3000 nodes and around 4300 edges. Sole´ et al. [37] go further in exploring the same Power
Grid data analyzed in [36], in particular, they focus on analyzing the targeted attacks to European Power Grids.
Rosas-Casals [42] once again considers the European High Voltage Power Grid to understand the distribution of
failures that have characterized it from 2002 to 2008.
Crucitti et al. [38] analyze the High Voltage Power Grid of Italy (127 substations and 171 lines belonging to
380kV network), France (146 substations and 223 lines belonging to 400kV network) and Spain (98 substations
and 175 lines belonging to 400kV network). This same sample is analyzed by Rosato et al. [39] to investigate the
main topological properties of these Grids.
Watts [24] dedicates a subsection to explore the properties of the Western States Power Grid of the U.S. This
Grid is treated as an undirected unweighted graph in which all the nodes of the network no matter their task
(e.g., generators, transformers, substations) are equally considered as nodes. The same assumption is done for
the edges: the transmission lines are considered equal even if the voltages they involve can be extremely different
(the Grid considered belongs only to High Voltage segment with lines varying from 345 to 1500 kV). The overall
graph is quite large (4941 nodes). This same network is the base for the study by Wang et al. [50] which focuses
on the vulnerability of the Grid.
Wang et al. [63, 46] investigate both on real Power Grid samples for about 8000 nodes (the networks analyzed
are the American NYISO and WSCC) and 4 synthetic reference models belonging to the IEEE literature that
account for about 500 nodes. In their other work, [49], Wang et al. consider once again the NYSO-2935 Bus and
the synthetic IEEE model: IEEE 300-Bus system.
The work of Bompard et al. [43] refers to the IEEE Bus blueprint infrastructure which applies an enhanced
betweenness analysis to the IEEE 300-Bus. Similarly the work of Dwivedi et al. [52, 53] which study respectively
the IEEE 39-Bus and the IEEE 118-Bus. Also the study of Pahwa et al. [56] refers to the synthetic Buses from
IEEE (IEEE 300-Bus and IEEE 118-Bus) and the WSCC 179-Bus equivalent. Arianos et al. [58] study smaller
IEEE networks: the IEEE 30-Bus and the IEEE 57-Bus.
In our work [40], we study the Medium Voltage and Low Voltage end of the Power Grid with special focus on
the northern Netherlands situation. The overall sample is almost 700 nodes for the Low Voltage part and 4200
for the Medium Voltage one.
Mei et al. in their book [41] perform various simulation related to Power Grid vulnerability and blackout
conditions considering the synthetic models of IEEE literature (e.g., IEEE 14-Bus, IEEE 30-Bus, IEEE 39-Bus
and IEEE 118-Bus) and also real samples of Chinese Power Grid. In particular they analyze the 500kV Northeast
Power Grid of China and a snapshot of Shanghai High Voltage Power Grid which consist of more than 200 nodes
and 300 lines.
Kim et al. [44] analyze basic metrics of several Grids both the synthetic ones belonging to IEEE literature
such as 14-Bus and 118-Bus (respectively 14 nodes and 20 edges and 118 nodes and 179 edges) and real High
Voltage networks. The real samples are the American Mid-Continental Area Power Pool (MAPP) of 230kV
and higher composed of 575 nodes and 754 edges, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) of 345kV
composed of 148 nodes and 209 edges and the Western Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC) from 100kV and
above which has about 4600 nodes and more than 6200 edges. In addition, they analyze the Nordel network
in Scandinavia (100kV and above) characterized by 410 nodes and 564 edges and the Korea Electric Power
Corporation (KEPCO) (66kV and above) made of 553 nodes and 783 edges.
Hines et al. [45] uses the High Voltage synthetic model IEEE 300-Bus system as the reference network on
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which compute centrality metrics exploiting the impedence representation of lines connecting Buses (nodes).
Han et al. [48] investigate the topological characteristics of two Power Grids sections belonging to the Chinese
High Voltage network: the Anhui Power Grid (84 nodes and 112 edges) and the bigger East China Power Grid
(769 nodes and 1029 edges). Also focused on the Chinese High Voltage Grid is the work of Ding et al. [51] analyze
the topological properties of two samples of the Chinese High Voltage Power Grid. In particular, the Sichuan-
Chongqing Grid (724 nodes and 771 edges) and the Guangdong Grid (956 nodes and 1049 edges). Guohua et
al. [54] analyze another sample of the Chinese Power Grid, in particular the North China Power Grid which is
composed by 2556 nodes and 2892 edges.
In one of the first comparison of power Grids [55], Sun compares the Western American Grid (≈5000 nodes
and ≈6600 edges), the North China Power Grid (≈8000 nodes and ≈9000 edges) and the Center China Power
Grid (≈2400 nodes and ≈2800 edges). The model used considers the transmission lines (above 110kV for the
Chinese samples and above 115kV for the American one) as unweighted and undirected edges, while generators,
substations and transformers are considered all equal nodes of the graph.
The Italian transmission is once again the example of network used to test Power Grid vulnerabilities [59],
comprising 521 nodes and 679 transmission lines. In addition in the same work a synthetic Bus with 34 nodes is
tested as well.
The work of Hines et al. [60] investigates the vulnerability aspects both of synthetic samples (IEEE 300-Bus)
and 40 control areas (out of the 136 areas) of the North American Eastern Interconnect Grid which represent
about 29000 nodes and 50000 transmission lines of the Grid.
The work of Pepyne [61] focuses on evaluating the cascading effects of synthetic models coming from the
IEEE literature (e.g., IEEE 57-Bus and IEEE 118-Bus) and on a sample satisfying the small-world model [1, 24]
of 200 nodes and 400 edges.
Brummitt et al. [62] investigate the cascading effects in interdependent networks (i.e., networks which are
loosely coupled) and the effects of adding connectivity (e.g., power lines) to mitigate or aggravate cascade effects.
For this purpose two loosely connected samples of the South-East region of the United States are used as samples,
for a total of about 900 nodes and 1300 edges.
A new geography is explored by Chaitanya et al. [64] who investigate the properties of an High Voltage Grid
of the eastern region of India. The network is built on 63 nodes and 113 transmission lines.
Notice that the numbers in the second and third column are not the exact numbers, but they are an approx-
imation to give the idea of the importance of the sample.
Summary:
In summary, the data are in the most cases extracted from real samples, that
is, they represent real electric infrastructures deployed other works in addition
to real Power Grids while fewer studies consider synthetic models as shown in
Figure 4. Most of these synthetic approaches consider samples coming from
IEEE blueprints such as IEEE Bus systems (a representation of the various
IEEE Bus models used in the surveyed articles is shown in Figure 5), while
very few concentrate only on other synthetic samples (e.g., non-IEEE models,
small-world models, random graphs); the number of synthetic model used is
shown in Figure 6. Almost all samples belong to the High Voltage end of the
Power Grid that are the lines used for long range transmission to which big
power plants are attached too; the only exception is our study [40] that is
focused on the distribution part of the Grid (i.e., Medium and Low Voltage
network). From a geographical perspective the samples are mainly localized
in the United States or in Europe with some studies that consider Chinese
High Voltage samples; a map of the countries whose Grids are analyzed is
represented in Figure 7 and the number Grid analyzed for a given country
is shown in Figure 8. Another main commonality is to treat the Grid as an
undirected graph where each substation or transformer represents a node and
each line transporting electricity is an edge.
3.2 Statistical global graph properties
The main characteristics from a graph and Complex Network Analysis perspective of the Grids under analysis
are summarized in Table 2. Several aspects of comparison are considered: the order (N) and size (M) of the
graph (second and third column) corresponds to the number of nodes (order) and number of lines (size) actually
in the Power Grids. The average degree, computed as < k >= 2MN , gives a general idea of how many vertexes
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Figure 4: Number of studies that consider real Power Grid samples or synthetic models.
Figure 5: IEEE literature bus model analyzed.
Figure 6: Number of models used coming from the IEEE literature compared to other models.
is an average vertex connected to (fourth column). Fifth, sixth and seventh column give information about the
type of statistical analysis performed on the graph, in particular, the assessment of node degree distribution
and betweenness distribution together with an evaluation of the path length are considered. Another term of
comparison deals with the type of graph analyzed taking into account weights or simply use the unweighted
definition of graph. Last two columns of the table consider the type of aim of the graph analysis either an
investigation of the disruption behavior of the graph or the evaluation of the small-world properties.
Many studies [40, 63, 24, 37, 42] remark the limited value of the average node degree, generally between 2 and
3, for the Power Grid especially if compared to other types of Complex Networks (e.g., the Web, social networks).
This is due to the physical, geographical and economical constraints that are associated to the substations and
power cables.
Half of the studies focuses on the investigation of the node degree distribution statistics since this information
is a key to find what kind of theoretical probability model is beyond the sample, allowing to establish which
kind of network the sample can be associated with. The other studies that do not take into account node
degree distribution statistics focus on other very specific aspects of the Complex Network Analysis. Betweenness
distribution statistics are less common, in fact, only few studies dig into this property, although it provides
essential information related to the load sustained by the nodes of the network.
Almost half the studies take into account the path length to investigate the effort that it takes to move from
one node to any other one. The study of the path length is usually not performed per se, but it is essential to then
2The values for nodes and lines in this table refer only to a snapshot of Shanghai Power Grid.
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Work Sample Sample Average Node Degree Betweenness Path Length Weighted/Unweighted Resilience Small-world
Order Size degree Distribution Distribution Analysis Analysis Analysis Investigation
Statistics Statistics
[31] ∼14000 ∼19600 ∼2.80 X X Unweighted X
[32] ∼300 ∼500 ∼3.33 X X Indirectly through Weighted not based X
efficiency metric on physical properties
[33] ∼314000 N.A. N.A. X Unweighted X
[34] ∼4800 ∼5500 ∼2.29 X X Unweighted X X
[35] ∼2700 ∼3300 ∼2.44 X Unweighted X
[36] ∼3000 ∼3800 ∼2.53 X X Unweighted X X
[37] ∼3000 ∼3800 ∼2.53 X Unweighted X
[38] ∼370 ∼570 ∼3.08 Indirectly through Unweighted X
efficiency metric
[39] ∼370 ∼570 ∼3.08 X X Unweighted X
[24] ∼4900 ∼6600 ∼2.69 X Unweighted X
[63] ∼8500 ∼13900 ∼3.27 X X Unweighted X
and impedance analysis
[40] ∼4850 ∼5300 ∼2.18 X X X Both X X
[41]2 ∼210 ∼320 ∼3.05 X Both X X
[42] N.A. N.A. X
[43] 300 411 2.74 Both X
[44] ∼6400 ∼8700 2.72 X Unweighted X X
[45] 300 411 2.74 X(chart only) X Both X
[46] ∼8500 ∼13900 ∼3.27 X Unweighted X
[48] ∼900 ∼1150 ∼2.55 X X X Weighted X X
[49] ∼3200 ∼7000 ∼4.375 X(chart only) X Weighted X
[50] ∼4900 ∼6600 ∼2.69 Unweighted X
[51] ∼1700 ∼1800 ∼2.12 X Both X
[52] ∼39 ∼46 ∼2.36 Weighted X
[53] ∼150 ∼46 ∼2.36 Weighted X
[54] ∼2556 ∼2892 ∼2.26 Weighted X
[55] ∼15400 ∼18368 ∼2.39 X(for one sample only) X Unweighted X X
[56] ∼550 ∼800 ∼2.91 X Unweighted X
[57] ∼14000 ∼19600 ∼2.80 Weighted not based on X
on physical properties
[58] ∼90 ∼120 ∼2.67 Weighted X
[59] ∼550 ∼700 ∼2.55 Weighted X
[60] ∼29500 ∼50000 ∼3.39 X Weighted X
[61] ∼400 ∼700 ∼3.5 X Weighted X X
[62] ∼900 ∼1300 ∼2.89 Unweighted X
[64] ∼60 ∼110 ∼3.67 Unweighted
Table 2: Comparison of the main characteristics of the graphs related to Power Grids.
1
2
Figure 7: Map of the Power Grid infrastructure studied using CNA approach.
Figure 8: Number of times Power Grid of a given country are investigated.
proceed in the investigation of the small-world property of the network. Almost all the studies that investigate
path properties then go further and evaluate the small-world characteristics as well.
Half of the studies performs analysis considering the unweighted definition of graph, while the other half
takes into account weights for investigating the graph. Crucitti et al. [32] use a weighted graph that anyway
has no relationship with the physical properties of the considered Power Grid. The weight used is related to
the betweenness managed by a node and it is partitioned between the edges it is connected to. Wang et al. [63]
consider an impedance analysis therefore dealing with the physical properties of the lines, but the Power Grid
graph are then not considered with the weighted definition, but only a probability distribution of the impedance
is computed. Again Wang et al. [49] use a weighted representation of the Grid by using an admittance matrix
which is based on the Laplacian matrix representation of the Power Grid enriched with the information about the
admittance of the lines connecting the nodes. In [40], we perform a weighted analysis considering the resistance
of cables as weights for the edges in the graph and we compute the same set of statistics for the unweighted and
weighted definition of the graph. One reason for the lack of weighted Complex Network Analysis analysis on real
samples of the Power Grid is probably due to the difficulty, first of having Grid data, and second of having the
detailed information of the cables involved. The work of Mei et al. [41] is particularly rich and complete in the
type and characteristics of the graph that are considered. Several models are considered based on the specific
aspect of the Power Grid that are analyzed in the various sections of the book. For instance the evaluation
of the small-world properties of the Power Grid and the power flow characterizing the Grid the graph is built
considering the admittance values that characterize the lines. In another chapter which analyzes the vulnerability
when considering the static behavior of the Power Grid the authors build a a directed graph with weights on the
edges that represent the length of the lines. Again in another chapter describing the growth and evolution models
of the Power Grid the graphs generated are considered undirected and unweighted. The weights considered in [43]
represent the power flows that move through the lines. Weights are also considered in [45] where an impedance
matrix representing the electrical properties of the physical network is used to assign weights to edges in the
IEEE Bus structure used. In [48] weights are represented by the reactance of the transmission lines which are
assigned as the values of the adjacency matrix representing the transmission lines. Another study that uses
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weights assigned to the edges representing the impedence of the transmission line is [51] where two samples of
the High Voltage Chinese Grid are analyzed. Other examples that take into account weights are [52, 53] where
the the graph representing the network is considered directed, since the Power Grid is assumed in a steady
state, and the weights are represented by the admittance matrix characterizing the lines. Guohua et al. [54]
analyze the North China Power Grid and the graph model that is used considers a weighted and directed graph,
associating weights both on nodes (amount of input power in the node) and edges (power transmitted on the
transmission line). The work of Sun [55] is mainly a comparison of the first results obtained considering Complex
Network Analysis techniques applied to the Power Grid field for the American Power Grid and two samples of
the Chinese Grid (North and Center China Power Grid ). The analysis performed by Kinney et al. consider once
again the U.S. Power Grid used in [31], but this time the graph is considered weighted both for edges and for
nodes. In particular a value of efficiency in the range of [0,1] is assigned to the edges representing their ability
to transmit power; for nodes a value of capacity is provided which is proportional to the betweenness of the
same node. Arianos et al. [58] evaluate the vulnerability of two samples coming from the IEEE Bus literature
(IEEE 30-Bus and IEEE 57-Bus). In their analysis the authors use impedences values and power distribution
factor associated to the transmission lines to have a model closer in his behavior to the real electric flow. The
model of the electrical flows considered is a direct current model which avoids much of the complexities behind
the real energy flow exchanges, but that in a Complex Network Analysis study is sufficient to have a good idea
and approximation of the power flows in the network. This same approach of characterizing transmission lines
with their physical parameters representing impedences and power distribution factor is used by Bompard et
al. [59] where the vulnerability results obtained with just topological measures are compared with a model that
takes into account enhanced physical aspects as well is applied both to a synthetic network (a Bus with 34
nodes) and to the Italian High Voltage Grid. Hines et al. [60] consider for their reliability evaluation the IEEE
300-Bus and a considerable sample of the North American Eastern Interconnect (almost 30000 nodes and 50000
edges). Their aim is to evaluate the adequacy of pure topological measures compared to measures that take into
account also the electrical and physical properties of the Grid. Therefore, the authors consider a simplification
of the Grid that exploits the direct current model for calculating the power flow in the network. To build this
model of power flow physical/electrical properties are added to the pure topological description of the Grid. In
particular, reactance values are assigned to the links and at each node a voltage phase angle is attributed so
that the power flow flowing through a transmission line can be computed knowing the amount of power flowing
through the neighboring nodes. The study of Pepyne [61] focuses on the investigation of cascading effects in
IEEE model buses (i.e., IEEE 57-Bus and IEEE 118-Bus) and on a small-world based network (200 nodes and
400 edges) using a DC power flow model to represent power flows to assess the lines affected in a cascading
situation. Brummitt et al. [62] consider a small section of the South-East US Grid in order to evaluate the effects
of enhanced connectivity of networks that are loosely connected. The two samples are about 400 and 500 nodes
and they are connected with each other by just eight edges. The Indian Power Grid is explored in [64] where the
very basic properties (e.g., average node degree, clustering coefficient) of the directed graph used to represent
the eastern region Indian High Voltage Power Grid are investigated.
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Summary:
From Table 2 a difference appears: the studies closer to a topological charac-
terization uses unweighted representation of the edges of the Grid and consider
always the node degree distribution in the analysis, since it is an important el-
ement to define the type of network under study (e.g., scale-free network). On
the other hand, the studies that apply a weighted representation of the graph
do not consider the node degree distribution statistics neither considering the
unweighted definition of node degree nor using a definition that takes into ac-
count weights as proposed in [65]. This last aspect might worth to be considered
since the degree distribution properties of the network might change the picture
of the node degree distribution in comparison with unweighted studies.
Centrality measures are not often used, exceptions are [41, 49, 43, 52] and
the few other that compute between distribution statistics, to identify the sta-
tistical distribution of critical nodes. More attention to centrality measures
especially using weighted representation of the Power Grid graphs or models
that provide the capacity or energy flows through the Grid might be beneficial
in understanding the most critical nodes or lines in the power system. Another
recurring theme in the Complex Network Analysis involving the Power Grid
is the reliability analysis, and actually it is the main motivation that drives
these kind of studies. In fact many works were performed after major black-
out occurred, such as the North American black-out of 20032 or the Italian
one of 20033 (e.g., [66, 67, 32, 33]) or anyway mention blackouts as the main
motivation for the work. The fragility and resilience properties of the Power
Grid has been the major reason of concern that has determined the focus of
such Complex Network Analysis studies on the High Voltage network. In fact
almost all studies consider the behavior of the Grid to various attacks to its
nodes or edges.
3.3 The small-world property
The small-world property in network has received lots of attention starting with sociological studies [68, 9],
but more recently with application of this concept and model to many more classes of networks [1, 24, 2, 69].
Among the studies analyzed small-world property investigation is performed by ten out of the thirty two. The
various studies look for the satisfaction of the small-world property described by Watts [24] then together with
Strogatz [1].
Holmgren [34] performs a comparison of the Nordic network with a random graph with the same number of
nodes and edges. The results show an average path length for the sample double compared to the random graph,
but a clustering coefficient almost one order of magnitude bigger than the random graph one, so the author
concludes the Nordic Grid belongs to the small-world class network.
Casals et al. [36] perform a comparison between each sample of the European Grid and random graphs. The
results show that the majority of samples satisfy the small-world conditions.
Watts [24] dedicates his book to illustrating the small-world phenomenon and a section is dedicated to the
analysis of the Western States Power Grid of the American network. He notes that sparseness of the graph
corresponding to the Grid violates one of the assumption usually necessary to have a small-world. Compared to
other types of networks (e.g., social network of actors’ interactions in movies), the clustering coefficient is quite
small and the characteristic path length quite big, however, despite these characteristics, he states that the small-
world property holds for the Western United States Power Grid. A statistic that emerges is the high fraction
of edges that are also shortcuts (i.e., if the edge is removed the shortest path between the same edge’s ends is
increased more than 2) for the graph which is around 80%. It might be due to the sparseness of the graph which
is implied by physical and economical limitations of adding lines to substations. Watts also notices that also
the way the Grid has developed supports the small-world concept: many independent and disconnected Grids
have been connected together with the aim of sharing and exchanging power excess between remote locations,
enhancing reliability and efficiency. Watts also notices that the model underlying the Western States Power Grid
is closer and better explained quantitatively from a relational model than a dimensional model. The former model
consider the creation of edges as a function of the preexisting edges in the graph, as if the previous relationships
between nodes were to a certain extent kept. The latter, on the other hand, considers the creation of edges as a
function of the particular spatial location of the vertex and the physical distance to another vertex. The better
explication by a relational model is quite surprising and counter-intuitive, but can be justified by the inability
3http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3152451.stm
4http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3146136.stm
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of the dimensional model to admit occasional global edges spanning across nodes otherwise very far apart. This
last property is the key to keep the small-world characterization.
Wang et al. [63] also investigate the small-world properties for their samples and they state that the model
proposed by Watts and Strogatz [1], is only able to capture some features of the Power Grid, since the Power
Grid is sparsely connected compared to small-world networks. They also notice that the basic condition required
by Watts and Strogatz’s model is not satisfied by the Power Grids under test.
In our study [40], we perform an investigation about the small-world properties of the Medium and Low
Voltage network comparing the sample topologies with random graphs with same order and size. The results
show that this end of the network seems even less close to small-world properties than the High Voltage due to
a general very small clustering coefficient.
In [41] the small-world concept is an essential aspect across the whole book. Actually the authors take as an
assumption the fact that the High Voltage Power Grid is a small-world network. This is justified by the authors
considering the type of evolution process that the Grid is subject to in its development. In fact, it consists in a
higher connectivity in a “local-world” where nodes (substations and power plants) are physically closer, therefore
forming tighter connections locally, and only few long distance links that help in reducing the average path length
of the network. In the small-world model also load and physical parameters are applied to make the model closer
to the real Power Grid system. This model is analyzed to investigate the vulnerability of the network and its
disruption behavior.
Kim et al. [44] investigate the small-world property of several High Voltage samples in particular comparing
the metrics of characteristic path length and clustering coefficient to the theoretical ones for random graphs.
Many of the samples (MAPP, Nordel, KEPCO and WSCC networks) satisfy the small-world conditions. The
authors also define a so called “small world-ness index” as SWI =
γ/γrnd
LCP /LCPrnd
; the more the index gets high
the more the network gets close to a small-world. The comparison between effects of line removal shows that
the topological measures of characteristic path length increases substantially (it almost doubles) between the
situation that do bring to outages and the ones that do not. Therefore the claim of the authors is that static
topological analysis can provide an insight about the faults on lines that might lead to outages problems.
Han et al. [48] perform a small-world analysis of two samples of the Chinese network. The small-world analysis
applied to the Anhui Grid does not satisfy the clustering coefficient condition which is slightly higher than the
one of a random graph with same order and size. On the other hand the other sample analyzed representing
East China Grid completely satisfies the small-world conditions.
Ding et al. [51] in addition to compute the usual metrics to evaluate the satisfaction of the small-world
property for the two Chinese Grid under investigation, concentrate their efforts on modifying and adapting the
small-world model to consider a weighted graph. They adapt the clustering coefficient by weighting the traditional
value of clustering coefficient by the ratio between the average impedence of the line in the neighborhood of
the considered node and the average impedence of all the lines in the network. Instead of considering the
Characteristic Path Length the authors use a similar quantity that can be applied also to a weighted condition
which is the characteristic node number (the median of the mean of the number of node traversed for all the
shortest paths connecting each vertex to all the others). The authors claim that the improved model better
captures the real characteristics of the Grid and it shows more than the unweighted model the compliance to the
small-world model in both the two samples analyzed.
Sun [55] evaluates the small-world properties in American, North and Center China Power Grid and the results
show that all these samples can be considered examples of small-world networks. The conditions of small-world
are satisfied for the three samples considered, but the Center China Power Grid actually is a borderline condition
especially for the clustering coefficient which is just 4 times higher than a random graph with same order and
size. The author stresses that although the Power Grid are systems that are developed in a careful manner and
each step of development is planned in detail, still some characteristics of randomness remain which might be
due to the many practical factors that involve the Power Grid plan. The author also remarks a known property
of small-world networks that is the ability in easily spread information in the same network. This aspect in the
Power Grid to a certain extent is not always beneficial since this also eases the spread of cascading failures that
lead to Power Grid blackouts.
Pepyne [61] uses a small-world network model to evaluate the cascading effects of networks with different
values of the rewiring probability parameter. The author also investigates the small-world properties of the
IEEE 57 and 118-Bus by verifying the conditions for these type of network defined by Watts and Strogatz [1, 24];
the two IEEE samples satisfy such conditions.
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Summary:
In general, the various studies tend not to have a common answer for the general
question regarding the membership of Power Grid networks to the small-world
group. It is indeed very specific to the samples analyzed and no conclusion
can be drawn, this seems especially true for the High Voltage Grid, while the
Medium and Low Voltage networks seem far from being a small-world net-
work [40].
3.4 Node degree distribution
The degree of a node is a property to understand how many other nodes it is connected to. However, this
information is not particularly important for big graphs since keeping track of each node degree may not be
manageable, instead it is better to have a general idea of the statistics of the node degree. In particular, its
probability distribution gives us some insights of the general properties of the networks such as the likely or
unlikely presence of nodes with very high degree (sometimes also referred as hubs). Table 3 shows the main
information about the degree distribution in the works that perform this study. The second column gives a
general idea of the type of cumulative node degree distribution that is investigated in the articles under review.
What is interesting is to fit the distribution to a class of curves. This is shown in the third column.
Work Cumulative Node Fitted
Degree Distribution Distribution
Probability Type
[31] Exponential y(x) ∼ e−0.5x
[32] Exponential y(x) = 2.5e−0.55x
[33] Power-law y1(x) = 0.84x−3.04
y2(x) = 0.85x−3.09
[35] Exponential y1(x) ∼ e−0.81x
y2(x) ∼ e−0.54x
[36] Exponential y(x) ∼ e−0.56x
[37] Exponential y(x) ∼ e−0.61x
[39] Exponential or y1(x) = e−0.18x
2
sum of exponential y2(x) = e−0.21x
2
+ 0.18e−0.25(x−4)
2
terms y3(x) = 0.96e−0.17x
2
+ 0.25e−0.19(x−3.9)
2
[63, 46] Sum of truncated y1(x) ∼ f1(x)
geometricaland irregular
discrete terms y2(x) ∼ f2(x)
[40] Power-law (unweighted) y1(x) ∼ x−1.49
and sum of exponential y2(x) ∼ 0.15e−21.47x + 0.84e−0.49x
terms (weighted)
[48] Exponential y1(x) ∼ e−0.65x
y2(x) ∼ e−0.58x
[55] Exponential y(x) ∼ e−0.5x
Table 3: Comparison of the node degree cumulative distribution probability functions.
As seen in the table, the results do not completely agree on the type of the distribution followed by the Power
Grid networks, but generally they are close to an exponential decay. Figures 9 and 10 represent the fitted node
degree cumulative distribution reported in the third column of Table 3. For [63, 46] presented in the table the
functions f1(x) and f2(x) are not reported in the table for size reason, but in footnote.
1 The plots in Figures 9
and 10 give a general idea of the shape of the distribution. The charts have to be interpreted in a qualitative
way since the details concerning the coefficients are not always available in the reviewed studies. In addition,
for studies concerning multiple samples (i.e., [35, 36, 40]) averages between all samples, or particular significant
samples have been chosen among the many available.
The investigation in [34] and the charts shown report a node degree distribution for the Western U.S. and for
the Nordic Grid that both seem to follow an exponential distribution.
The results found in [45] show that the properties of the network (the IEEE 300-Bus blueprint with 300
nodes and 411 edges) change once the weights, in the specific case the impedance characterizing the lines, are
considered in the network instead of the traditional topological ones. With impedance as weights on the edges
the shortest paths that are computed are actually the ones that the current flow follows according Kirchoff’s
1 f1(x) =
∑
xi<x
0.2269(0.7731)xi ∗ {0.4875δ(1), 0.2700δ(2), 0.2425δ(3)} xi = 1, 2, . . . 34
f2(x) =
∑
xi<x
0.4085(0.5916)xi ∗ {0.3545δ(1), 0.4499δ(2), 0.1956δ(3)} xi = 1, 2, . . . 16
The ∗ symbol is here to be considered as the convolution operator and the δ is the Dirac delta function.
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electrical laws. In fact, if the graph is rebuilt considering only the 411 node-to-node connections (which are the
411 paths with minimal cost in the original graph representation) with smallest impedance (defined as electrical
connectivity) the resulting graph is dominated by few hubs, thus suggesting a scale-free topology when electrical
connectivity is considered.
The charts shown in [49] that analyze the node degree centrality distribution give an idea about the type of
relationship that the node have resembling a power-law. A similar tendency is shown in the chart representing
the node degree centrality distribution taking into account the electrical parameters of the network (impedence
of transmission lines).
Summary:
In general the various studies focusing on the High Voltage Grids agree on a sta-
tistical distribution for node degree that follows an exponential (or exponential
based) distribution with characteristic parameters of the exponential curve that
depend on the specific Grid analyzed. While High Voltage Grid have been quite
extensively analyzed the Medium and Low Voltage Grids have not found much
attention so far and a deeper and wider investigation needs to be performed
in different geographies since the only study (i.e., [40]) is representative of the
Northern part of the Netherlands. In addition, the distribution Grid will be
the section of the Power Grid mostly impacted by Smart Grid technology [70].
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Figure 9: Log-log plot of fitted node degree cumulative probability distribution corresponding to the first six
rows of Table 3.
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Figure 10: Log-log plot of fitted node degree cumulative probability distribution corresponding to the last five
rows of Table 3.
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3.5 Betweenness distribution
Betweenness is an important measure to assess how a node is central in a network. This metric in fact computes
how many shortest paths traverse a node, therefore giving an information of the importance of the node in the
path management. The main characteristics of the betweenness study are summarized in Table 4 where the
second column shows the type of followed distribution, while the analytical function is represented in the third
column. Unfortunately, this metric is computed by only five studies ( [31, 32, 40, 48, 49]).
Work Cumulative Betweenness Fitted
Distribution Distribution
Probability Type
[31] Power-law y(x) ∼ (2500 + x)−0.7
[32] Power-law y(x) ∼ 10000(785 + x)−1.44
[40] Power-law and y1(x) ∼ x−1.18
exponential y2(x) ∼ 0.68e−6.8·10
−4
x
[48] Power-law y(x) ∼ x−1.711
y(x) ∼ x−1.482
Table 4: Comparison of the betweenness cumulative distribution probability functions.
Although the studies that perform this type of analysis are only few, one can see that there is a tendency
for the High Voltage network to have a betweenness distribution close to a Power-law. For the Medium and
Low Voltage the situation is less clear: some samples analyzed in [40] follow an exponential decay, especially
the Low Voltage ones, while other, usually the bigger belonging to the Medium Voltage, follow a Power-law. In
Figure 11 the plot of the distributions is represented to show the difference between the trend of the Power-law
and exponential decay: after a certain point the exponential distribution has a faster decay.
The work of Hines et al. [45] reinforces the idea that betweenness has a Power-law trend in its probability
distribution. In particular, the author analyzes betweenness in a condition where weights representing lines
impedance are considered. The results show, even without providing an analytical representation, a tendency for
this metric of being dominated by few nodes that support much of the weighted paths, while the majority of the
nodes is only slightly involved. This suggests a Power-law distribution.
Wang et al. [49] investigate several centrality measures (i.e., degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, closeness,
betweenness both on vertexes and edges). The normalized vertex betweenness whose chart is given in [49] suggests
the presence of a Power-law although the analytical description of the best fitting curve is not given. The authors
interestingly note that there is a very good accordance in this metric between the values computed with the
electrical parameters (weighted analysis based on admittance matrix) and purely topological one; there is in fact
an 80% overlap in the first 10 nodes most with highest betweenness.
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Figure 11: Log-log plot of fitted betweenness cumulative probability distribution corresponding to Table 4.
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Summary:
Power-law seems the dominating rule for betweenness probability distribution
even if few studies consider this statistical property of graphs. To draw a general
definitive conclusion regarding this property for the Power Grid more studies
are required. Another aspect to be considered which has not received much
attention so far is the study of betweenness statistics in weighted Grid models
or when power flows are considered instead of the pure topological analysis.
3.6 Resilience analysis
The characterization of resilience is the main motivation for the studies involving Complex Network Analysis and
Power Grid. In fact, the behavior in terms of connectivity of the network when nodes or edges are removed is
the primary question in many works considering failures that happen in a random fashion or following an attack
strategy. Table 5 describes the different types of resilience analysis that are performed by the various authors. In
particular, the second column contains the metric that is used to assess the reliability of the network. The focus
of the attack either it is related to nodes or edges is considered in third and fourth column, while the fifth column
remarks the studies that in addition to the resilience analysis also propose a mitigation strategy for improving
Grid reliability.
Work Resilience Analysis Type Node
attack
Edge
attack
Grid im-
provement
[31] Connectivity loss X
[32] Efficiency X
[33] Loss of load probability X X
[34] Influence on largest component size
and path length
X X
[35] Robustness through mean degree, mo-
tifs and patch size analysis
[36] Influence on largest component size X
[37] Influence on largest component size e
comparison with theoretical results
X
[38] Damages and improvements X X
[39] Nodes disconnection and improve-
ments
X X
[40] Influence on largest component size X X
[41] Several criticality analysis and black-
out models
X X
[42] Reliability and disturbances
[43] Unserved energy/load X X
[44] Critical Path Length X
and clustering coeff.
[45] Sensitivity
[46] Influence on largest spanning cluster
size
X
[48] Loss of load and failure endurance X
[50] Avalanche size X
[52] Flow availability X
[53] Efficiency X
[54] Largest power supply region X X
[56] Influence in network connectivity X
and power degradation
[57] Efficiency X
[58] Efficiency, net-ability, overload X
[59] Efficiency, net-ability, overload X
[60] Path length, connectivity loss, X
[61] Line overload, cascade effects, X X
network disruption
[62] Overload, cascade effects, X X
blackout size
Table 5: Comparison of the resilience analysis and improvement studies.
Node based attack analysis
Albert et al. [31] show the cascading effect of the whole American Power Grid when removing a certain fraction
of nodes. In particular, the authors define the concept of connectivity loss which expresses the magnitude of
the substations that cannot receive power from any generator due to failures in the network and thus inhibiting
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the end users as well to receive any power. The connectivity loss assumes different levels of severity based
on the type of nodes, i.e., transmission substations, that are removed. The random removal of these nodes
has a limited impact on the connectivity loss, that increases almost linearly with the removal; the situation is
completely different if the removal targets the nodes with highest betweenness especially when the betweenness
is re-calculated after each new removal. In this situation, the connectivity loss increases harshly after a certain
number of substations are compromised and just removing 2% of the nodes brings to a connectivity loss of about
60%; the behavior is the typical non-linear one that characterizes threshold effects.
Crucitti et al. [32] propose a model that considers efficiency, a measure inversely proportional to the shortest
path. In particular for each node the authors define weights both for nodes (i.e., the maximum capacity a
substation can handle, taking also into account a certain level of permitted tolerance or overcapacity) and for
edges (i.e., the ability of delivering power for a certain transmission line). To study cascading effects after the
removal of one node, the edge weights are re-calculated to investigate what effects on the system are triggered,
and what is the new ability of edges in supporting paths. They show the cascading effects and the problems
the network suffers in term of efficiency in different situations: random node removal and highest load-based
removal. The results show a dissimilar behavior in the two situations especially when the tolerance parameter
is low (i.e., the substations are considered to operate with small possibility to sustain more than the nominal
capacity). Also in this case the worst results are experienced when the nodes with highest load are removed one
after each other. Perhaps surprisingly, there is a non-perfect correlation between node degree and betweenness:
it is not implied that the nodes with highest degree have always a high load.
Casals et al. [36] investigate the behavior of the European Grid under failures or attacks. The analysis shows a
typical pattern already known for many other type of networks: the giant component (i.e., the biggest connected
component) of the network vanishes after a threshold of nodes is removed and a phase transition occurs. The
theoretical threshold that is computed for exponential node degree-based graphs well suits the empirical details
that are extracted from the samples. Under random failures the decrease in the order of the giant component
is continuous until the threshold is reached; under targeted attacks (e.g., removal of nodes with highest degree)
the samples show a network disruption that appears when a smaller fraction of nodes is removed. A remarkable
result the authors find is the relation between the order of the network and the order of the giant component:
an increase in the number of nodes of the network makes it more prone to failures, but at the same time the way
the networks have evolved tend to reduce their fragility.
Sole et al. [37] investigate the consequences of intentional attacks European Power Grid might face. The
targeted attack problem is translated into an equivalent problem of random failures such that it can be studied
with percolation theory, thus identifying a threshold of nodes to be removed to breakdown the giant component
of the network. The fraction of nodes to be removed in targeted attacks towards highly connected vertexes
is, as intuition might suggest, much smaller than in random attacks. The results show that there is generally
an acceptable matching between the theoretical parameters found and the value extracted from the samples,
nevertheless some deviations are present especially for those networks that are more robust. A remarkable aspect
is that there is a correlation between the critical fraction removal and the most important reliability indexes
used by power engineers to measure the Power Grid performances (e.g., energy not supplied, loss of power,
interruption time). In fact, the two groups of European Grids that are considered (based on the similarity of
the calculated and theoretical value of the threshold) although managing almost the same amount of power and
energy, show very different results in terms of failures. The networks with threshold that deviates positively from
the theoretical values are much robust and experience small reliability issues, thus reinforcing the correlation
between non-topological reliability indicators and the topological ones.
Wang et al. extend forward in the analysis done in [63] and in [46] by studying the vulnerability properties
of four synthetic IEEE Bus models and two real networks (NYISO and WSCC). They evaluate the robustness
of the samples in two distinct situations: random node removal and targeted attack towards node with highest
node degree. They evaluate the presence of a threshold value in the number of nodes removed before the network
spanning cluster (i.e., a notion equivalent to the largest connected component of a graph) is fragmented. The
authors reach the non-surprising conclusion that networks are more vulnerable if the nodes with the highest
degree are attacked first compared to a random attack. The main finding is the definition of the equation that
computes the critical fraction of nodes that destroy the spanning cluster in targeted attack conditions. In fact,
they find that this value is influenced by the node degree distribution of the network. As a better fitting to the
theoretical value of the critical fraction (threshold) the authors propose to consider the node degree distribution
is modeled with a truncated geometric distribution plus an irregular discrete distribution [63], rather than an
exponential one as computed for the critical fraction in [37, 36].
Han et al. [48] consider two elements to characterize problems in the Power Grid: load operating limit and
the maximal load that a node is able to support. The reactance value of lines is adjusted accordingly when the
operating limit is overtaken and the line is considered discarded if the load of the node to which it is connected is
higher than the maximum supported value. The mechanism for evaluating the spread of failures in the network
is by rerouting the paths when the nodes (and the edges attached to them) are not available. To show the impact
of failures the authors use a loss of load metric which is given by the ratio between the load of nodes which are
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no more in operation (since they have overtaken their limits) and the initial load supported by all the nodes.
This loss of load metric is applied to evaluate the effects of two sorts of failure modes: nodes with high degree
and high load are removed first and the effects are evaluated; nodes are divided in groups and average load for
each group is computed, then the first 20 groups of nodes in terms of their load are removed, a second mode of
evaluation is by random group removal and after each removal an increase in capacity factor of lines by 0.0125 is
performed. These removal methods are applied to both the Anhui and East China Power Grids and they show
for both networks that the spread of failures when attacking high degree nodes spreads quite slowly; on the other
hand, when the nodes with high load are attacked the small-world network (i.e., East China Power Grid) appears
particularly vulnerable and causes an important decrease in transmission capacity. The second type of attacks
(based on group of nodes) evaluates the effects on the reduction of load by a group of nodes removal compared to
the effects of the removal of the first group of nodes; this is to test the endurance capability of the network. The
results show that Anhui Grid (non small-world) improves its performance thanks to the increase in capacity at
each round, on the other hand the improvement is extremely limited in the East China Power Grid. The authors
claim that the weaknesses of the small-world network compared to the other under test is due to the very nature
of the network itself because of the high heterogeneity the nodes have in their load, with few nodes (those that
are attached to the “shortcut” edges) having to sustain heavy load.
Wang et al. [50] consider the behavior of the network and the cascading failures issues when nodes with high
and low load are attacked respectively. Conversely from other works the definition the authors provide in their
work for load is obtained by a product of the node degree and the sum of the node degree of the neighbors of
the same node amplified or lessen by a tunable parameter that represent the initial load of a node. In addition
each node is characterized by a tolerance parameter which directly influence the capacity (maximal load) that
the node is able to sustain. If the limit is overtaken than the node is considered broken and the load sustained
is redistributed to its neighboring nodes proportionally to their initial load. A node that is under attack has to
redistribute its load to its neighbors. The metric used in to understand the problem induced by an attack are
measured through an avalanche size indicator that considers how many nodes reach the failure condition after an
attack is performed. The authors consider two strategy for attacks: the first strategy involves nodes with highest
load that are attacked in descending order and the second strategy attacks nodes starting from those with lowest
load in ascending order. The authors find that, based on the initial load that is given to nodes, it is more likely
that one strategy or the other is more critical in triggering avalanche failures. In particular, when the initial load
is limited the cascade effects are triggered by the nodes with the lowest one, the situation is reversed when the
initial load is bigger: highest load nodes attacks generate cascade effects behaviors. Typical of this work is the
presence of a threshold in the tolerance of the lines: if the tolerance is above the threshold then the network do
not experience avalanche effects, but if the threshold is even slightly overtaken the cascade effect arises.
Kinney et al. [57] perform a comprehensive analysis of the failure behavior of the U.S. Power Grid. The
metric that is assessed is the damage that is inflicted to the network computed as the loss in average efficiency
(defined as the average over all paths of the harmonic composition of the efficiencies of the edges composing
the path) of the network before and after the breakdown has occurred. The mechanisms considered for the
simulation of the failures are two: 1) single node removal and 2) progression removal of nodes. For each of the
two schemes two different methods of node selections are used: a random choice of the node or nodes to remove
and a targeted selection involving the nodes that support the highest load. The results found show that in low
tolerance conditions (i.e., the capacity of nodes is very close to their initial load) just the removal of a node can
cause a damage equal to 25%. In general the authors find three categories in which the nodes can be fitted: nodes
whose removal causes no or very little damage independently of the tolerance parameter, and these are about
the 60% of the overall nodes of the U.S. Power Grid; very critical nodes whose removal causes high damages in
the network even when the tolerance is high; nodes whose removal causes damages depending on the tolerance of
the network, usually a threshold value exists that is responsible for a steep transition from a little damage to an
high damage situation, this last type of nodes are the majority in the network. Usually, nodes that cause critical
effects if removed are also characterized by topological properties. In particular, nodes causing no efficiency loss
have both low betweenness and low node degree: 90% of the transmission nodes that cause almost no damage to
the network have 2 as node degree and load smaller than 2000. The main finding is once again that the removal
of nodes with high betweenness and high node degree are the most critical and just the removal of 0.33% of
nodes (those with such characteristics) generates more than 40% of damage in the network. The work suggests
that changes in topology by adding more transmission lines and substation can help in decrease the sensitivity
to failures of high load transmission lines.
Hines et al. [60] have the goal of comparing the vulnerability analysis obtained considering Grid models based
only on topological properties and Grid models that take into account also the electrical/physical properties
in order to assess the goodness of topological analysis in Power Grid vulnerability problems. To perform this
comparison three metrics are evaluated, two of them are typical of the Complex Network Analysis literature and
the third is more related to the electrical behavior of the Grid. In particular, the first metric assessed is the
Characteristic Path Length so that as the components in the Grid fail the effort in the reachability of other nodes
is evaluated compared to the initial situation. The second topological parameter investigated is the connectivity
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loss (metric already used in [31]) which considers the percentage of generating nodes that are unreachable due
to failures in the network. The third metric takes into account the blackout size as the amount of power load
that has been curtailed as a consequence of the cascading failures in the Power Grid. In order to evaluate this
last metric a model considering physical/electrical parameters and the direct current power flow is proposed (see
description for [60] in Section 3.2 for the details of the model). The authors consider different types of failures
that the network is subject to: random failures of nodes, degree-based attack which removes nodes one after
each other starting with nodes with the highest degree. Another attack is based on the maximum traffic that
a node manages in terms of power that flows through it and the attack targets the node with highest traffic;
the opposite situation is also considered: minimum traffic attack that removes nodes starting with those having
smallest traffic. The last attack considered takes into account betweenness and nodes with highest betweenness
are removed first. Considering the path length metric the attacks based on degree, max-traffic and betweenness
provoke grater damage in terms of path length compared to a random removal of nodes; the min-traffic has a
behavior almost the same as random failures. The same considerations can be applied for the connectivity loss
metric showing that the Power Grid is more vulnerable to directed attacks than random, a behavior thus more
similar to scale-free networks. Generally the same considerations apply to the blackout size metric too, but it
worths to highlight that just by attacking the 10 nodes with highest max-traffic creates a blackout with average
size of 72%, while a random attack on 10 nodes on average results in a blackout of just 20% while the removal of
10 nodes with min-traffic results in 5% average blackout. Although the general intuition shows that attacks that
target nodes with certain properties are more damaging than random or min-flow attacks it worths to remark
that for the three metrics considered (i.e., path length, connectivity loss and blackout size) there is no accordance
on the type of attack that causes the most damages: in the first case it is betweenness, in the second case it
is node degree and for blackout metric it is max-traffic that provokes the most damage. The authors conclude
that topological measures provide some indication of the vulnerability of a network, but they remark also that
if taken alone they could be misleading especially if mitigation strategies on failure reduction are based on one
topological result only. The authors also stress that physics-based models are more realistic and generally more
useful for infrastructure risk assessment than topological only models.
Edge based attack analysis
Kim et al. in [44] replicate two blackout conditions that happened in the United States in 1996 by inspecting the
topological properties of these networks during the cascade events that brought to the blackout. In particular,
the authors simulate on the Power Grid graph the power line trimming process events that happened and other
line removal events that do not lead to outages in the network. The metrics that they inspect to assess the
vulnerability are two static topological metrics: clustering coefficient and characteristic path length; they also
combine them into the “small world-ness index” as described in Section 3.3.
Dwivedi et al. [52] consider the vulnerability that an IEEE 39-Bus is subject to when the most central lines
are removed. The centrality metric developed in this work considers the flow that power lines are able to support
given their physical properties (admittance values): the lines that carry more flow (appropriately normalized to
make the comparison fair between the power supported by the different source and sink nodes) are the most
central. The authors claim that this method of investigating the most critical lines is more precise and accurate
than the purely topological one, since it takes into account the amount of power that a certain line provides.
However, the authors specify that some of the lines identified as important through this weighted centrality
method are the same that can be identified with a pure topological investigation, thus stressing their importance
also from a topological point of view. The same authors in [53] investigate the vulnerability of IEEE 39-Bus
and IEEE 118-Bus. Even in this case they consider a weighted approach for the network characterized by his
reactance parameters as weights. Betweenness values for the weighted networks are computed for each line so
that it is available a ranking of the most critical or vulnerable lines. For each IEEE synthetic model two strategy
of network disruption are applied: random line removal and removal based on the ranking of betweenness. The
results are evaluated considering the efficiency of the network computed for each line as the inverse of the the
reactance. The simulations show results which are not completely unexpected and that are common for Power
Grid networks: a quite good robustness towards random attacks (small reduction of network efficiency); the
situation changes when the most critical lines are attacked for which there is a considerable reduction in the
network efficiency (60% reduction for the 39-Bus and almost 40% for the 118-BUS) by just removing the 10 most
critical edges.
Pahwa et al. [56] consider the effects of cascading effects in synthetic models when lines are removed. In
particular in their analysis they categorize the links in two types: vulnerable and non-vulnerable depending
on the damage they create in the network (more or less than 10% upon their removal). The metrics that are
computed to assess the damages are the influence in network connectivity which is purely topological and the
Power Degradation which is the fall in the total load supported by the network compared to the original supported
load. The authors propose synthetic models of networks generated in random fashion with same order and size of
the reference engineering literature (i.e., IEEE, WSCC) samples. The results show that the generated networks
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achieve a new equilibrium situation after a cascading is initiated in less steps, while the literature samples stabilize
at a later stage when nodes or load is removed.
Arianos et al. [58] analyze the vulnerability of two samples of the IEEE literature. The authors compute three
set of metrics: efficiency already applied in Power Grid studies [38, 57], net-ability and overload. The net-ability
takes into account the path from a generator node to a load. It is proportional to the power share of the considered
path in transmitting power from generator to load and inversely proportional to the electrical distance (i.e., a
function to weight the edges based on the path traversed, the power factor and the impedence of the involved
lines) between generator and load. It turns out to be proportional to the power transmission distributor factor
for the line and the impedence of the same line. An overload metric is computed by considering the sum over the
whole network of the ratio between the power flow of lines and their power flow limit. The difference between the
overload condition before and after the removal of a line is the assessed parameter. The test that is performed
on the network consists of line removal: for each line removed separately the three metrics mentioned above are
computed. The main finding of the analysis is that the metric based on efficiency do not show much difference
in the reduction of efficiency of the network when different lines are removed from the network, thus it does not
provide much information about the criticality of a line. On the other hand, the net-ability and the overload
metric present peaks values when specific lines are removed, thus being more precise to localize potential failing
lines. Using the same set of metrics just described the critical lines analysis is applied to the a small synthetic
Bus (34 nodes) and to the Italian High Voltage Grid in [59]. The main idea is to show how different are the
results when metrics based on pure topological parameters are applied compared to the results obtained when
also the physical characteristics of lines and nodes are also taken into account. The analysis performed on the
effects of a single transmission line removal both in the synthetic sample and in the Italian Power Grid show that
the net-ability metric captures better the lines whose fault results in worse disrupting conditions for the network
compared to the efficiency metric. The same conclusion i.e., better adequacy of the metrics that take physical
quantities into account is obtained also considering the entropic degree compared to the traditional node degree
to rate importance of nodes. Entropic degree is defined considering not only the number of connections that a
node has, but also the weights that the lines attached to the node have considering their impedence value [59].
The conclusion is that pure topological node degree may underestimate the real importance the nodes. It is
interesting to remark that the authors of [58, 59] claim that the critical lines identified by using the net-ability
metric are the same that the Italian Grid operator identifies as critical using engineering and electrotechnical
approach to Power Grid failure analysis.
Pepyne [61] evaluates the cascading effects on IEEE blueprint networks. The author uses a DC flow model
to characterize the network and to assess the cascading effects: each line is characterized by an impedence and
at each node with generating capabilities a power flow injection is randomly assigned as well as the load nodes
demand. In the study the line with the highest load is then brought to the 99% of its trip point and subsequently
overloaded to study the evolution of power redistribution process and eventual subsequent failures of other lines.
The condition the author evaluates to consider the cascading effects are two: 1) the cascading sequence proceeds
till the network breaks apart into disconnected islands; 2) the cascade is self-limiting and stops before breaking
up the grid. The simulation on the IEEE 57-Bus sample shows that just after 4 lines experiencing outages,
the network breaks apart. The author evaluates also the behavior of small-world networks while increasing the
rewiring probability of edges from a situation close to a regular lattice (rewiring probability p = 0.001) and a
situation closer to a random graph (rewiring probability p = 0.5). The author finds that with an increase in
rewiring probability (i.e., which corresponds to an increase in the number of so-called “shortcut” edges) there are
two effects: 1) the load of the network increases and the line congestion decreases (measured as the mean and
maximum line loading); 2) the network is more fragile in cascading failures than regular topologies since it tends
to break apart just after few lines are in failure state. The author also tests a solution based on the upgrade of
lines that in the IEEE Bus model act as kind of “shortcut” links whose capacity is doubled. The simulations
with improved lines show that the average load of lines reduces thus being able to accommodate more load on
average, on the other hand since the maximum loadability of lines is higher, more load has to be redistributed
in case of failures, therefore the overall effect is a slightly more fragile Grid. The author finally suggests possible
improvements for the real Grids: adding new “shortcut” links and increase the capacity of the existing “shortcut”
links.
Node and edge based attack analysis
Chassin et al. [33] define a failure propagation model that considers failure probability for nodes and failure
probability for edges. For the latter, although the model is based on an undirected graph, the propagation of
failures happens in a directed way, i.e., the propagation evolves when the power flows from the node and the
node supports the edge. The two probabilities of failure are then combined together to determine the Loss Of
Load Probability. The results obtained in term of Loss of Load Probability are similar to the ones obtained for
other electrical systems by electrical engineering studies, supporting the validity of the model.
In [40], we perform a reliability analysis considering different node removal strategies: random, node degree-
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based, betweenness-based. We evaluate the order of the largest connected component while nodes are removed.
The results obtained show a general robustness of Medium and Low Voltage networks to random attacks while
they are extremely vulnerable to targeted attacks. The study also investigates the reliability regarding attacks
towards edges exploiting the Laplacian matrix spectrum method to identify the most critical edges.
The book [41] focuses on evaluating and modeling the reliability of the Power Grid considered as a system
which is characterized by a self-organized criticality behavior and modeling the behavior of the Grid that drives
to blackout situations. The vulnerability assessments performed are several. To evaluate the reliability of the
network the authors consider the static behavior (i.e., in steady state conditions) of the Power Grid when lines
are removed. The authors develop a set of indexes to evaluate 1) the impact the faults has on active power
transmission 2) the influence of the fault in local balance of reactive power. The first index is called average
electric transmission distance and considers the ratio between the weighted transmission path length (a weighted
path where the weights are the product of active power transmitted and physical length of the line) and the
total power received by nodes; this index is a global measure that describes the influence of network structure on
transmission of active power. The second pair of indexes takes into account the local balance in reactive power
in particular the first index considers the difference in the voltage experienced before and after the fault, the
second considers the variation in the reactive power supplied by generators before and after the fault compared
to the maximal reactive power they can provide. The global and local metrics are then combined into a single
vulnerability index. Using this combined index the authors then assess the vulnerability of the transmission lines
of IEEE-30 and IEEE-118 Bus systems and a snapshot of Shanghai Power Grid of 2006. They also compare the
results obtained through the method proposed in traditional power electrical analysis related to lines criticality;
the results show a good agreement in identifying the most vital lines for the operation of the Grids. In another
section of the book an investigation of vulnerability more in line with traditional high level Complex Network
evaluates the behavior of Power Grid generated following the small-world model proposed by the authors for
Power Grid evolution. They consider several types of attacks on nodes (random node, static node degree,
dynamic node degree which is recalculated after each removal, node betweenness) and on lines (random line, line
betweenness). The metrics they evaluate are similar to the ones of other works such as efficiency in transmission
calculated as the ratio between the sum of the reciprocal of the shortest path between any two nodes after the
failure has occurred and before the problem has taken place. All these types of attack and the metrics computed
are applied to small-world generated networks, a 300 Bus network, IEEE-30 and IEEE-118 Bus systems. The
main distinction between the small-world and IEEE networks lies in a better reliability of small-world networks
towards random failures compared to IEEE, on the other hand IEEE Bus systems report better scores when the
attacks are targeted (i.e., betweenness of degree based). The book also models the blackout situations occurring
in a power systems considering a model based on DC (direct current) power flow and AC (alternating current)
from a more electrical (power flow equations and power system constraints are applied) than topological point
of view. These models are respectively applied to the High Voltage Power Grid of North East China and to
IEEE-30 Bus system.
Bompard et al. [43] considers betweenness as the metric to investigate in analyzing the vulnerability of Power
Grids. Unlike the other studies [31, 32, 40, 41] which consider betweenness only from a topological point of view,
the author builds a graph which has on each edge a weight that represents the value of power flow that is managed
by the line; the betweenness computed with such a graph is called electrical betweenness. The metric assessed to
evaluate the removal of nodes, or edges, with highest electrical betweenness is the unserved energy. The results
obtained by removal of edges, or nodes, considering the electrical betweenness are more critical compared to the
ones found in computing topological betweenness since the quantity of unserved load is higher in the first case.
The author therefore claims that electrical betweenness is a more correct indicator than topological betweenness
when assessing vulnerability of Power Grids.
Guohua et al. [54] evaluate the vulnerability of the North China Power Grid. As the metric to evaluate the
effects of the disruption the authors propose the largest power supply region index which is obtained by the ratio
between the maximum load that the system can handle after a cascading failure has occurred, and the initial total
load of the system. To assess this metric different disruption policies are applied. Random failures happening on
lines are simulated and the probability law governing the failures of the lines is a Poisson distribution. A second
type of attack involves nodes and they are attacked in descending order of node degree. Third type of attack
considered deals with nodes that have the highest vulnerability index: in the weighted and directed model of
network the authors consider, each node has a supported input power that gives it a certain weight, but also the
lines to which it is attached (that have a transmission power limit which is the line weight) are an important
part to define the node vulnerability index which turns out to be the product of the node weight and the line
weight. The last policy considered in the paper is a targeted attack on lines based on their descending line
vulnerability index which is equal to the betweenness value for an edge when the graph is considered weighted
and directed. The results on the North China Power Grid following these attacks show that the Grid supports
quite well random failures of lines since no cascading effects happen. On the other hand, the selective attack on
high degree nodes are more damaging increasing the spread of damages in the network. Even more critical for
the Grid are the attacks based on node vulnerability index and line vulnerability index which generates serious
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disruption in the network by leading to cascading effects.
Other type of robustness analysis
Casals et al. [35] find that each single Grid composing the European network has a characteristic parameter
that is related to its specific robustness. The authors investigate three main elements to assess the robustness of
the different Grids: mean degree distribution, motifs analysis and patch size distribution. The first indicator is
related to the comparison of the average degree of each Grid sample with the average degree obtained by the best
fitting Poisson distribution (Poisson distribution for node degree arises from a random graph). The assumption
is that when the number of nodes is sufficiently big the exponential tail and the Poisson one are very similar;
the authors suggest that, the more the average node degree deviates from the Poisson distribution value, the
most fragile is the network. This might seem counter-intuitive, but the networks that deviate more from the
random topology are more fragile. The second idea is the investigation of motifs (i.e., linear, stars, triangles)
inside the network. The conclusion the authors draw out is that fragility increases as the elements of the Grid
become more interconnected and motifs such as stars and triangles begin to appear. Patch size distribution is
the third element taken into account to characterize the relation between topology and robustness of network.
The results suggest that a balanced distribution i.e., having a constant frequency of patches with different areas,
characterizes more robust networks. The ideas and results presented are original and interesting even if, as the
authors explicitly mention, a more deep analysis and comparison with Grid’s dynamical results are needed.
Rosas-Casals [42] performs a slightly different type of study to evaluate the statistics of the European High
Voltage Grid. It evaluates the statistical distribution of three metrics that are common in the assessment of the
performance of electrical systems adopted by electrical engineers: energy not supplied, total loss of power and
restoration time. Information about the statistics of failures are obtained by the ENTSO-E (European Network
of Transmission System Operators for Electricity). Based on the results of his previous study of European Grid
classification as robust or fragile networks [35], the author considers the statistical distribution of the three
reliability measures investigating the presence of Power-law characteristics in their distributions. The presence
of Power-law distribution is plausible only for the restoration time statistics. One of the interesting findings is
that robust grids accumulate less failure events than the fragile ones, but the events that strike robust networks
lead usually to important consequences, on the other hand fragile networks have more frequent problems but
their consequences are usually limited.
Hines et al. [45] consider a different metric in assessing the vulnerability of the network that is based on the
physical properties (line resistance) of the network: sensitivity. Sensitivity, which is defined as a ratio between a
resistance of a path from one node to any other node and the resistance of the node itself, expresses the extent to
which a state change in one node propagates to another node. The results show that sensitivity decades linearly
with the distance between nodes, but the more the network has a scale-free structure the more the number of
nodes are involved. For the IEEE 300-Bus the results suggest a behavior in the decrease in sensitivity with
distance between nodes similar to the one of a random graph with same number of nodes and edges.
The vulnerability analysis performed by Sun [55] is actually a description of results obtained by other studies
(e.g., [67, 57, 71, 72]) on Complex Networks and Power Grid studies on the behavior of networks under failures
of nodes or edges.
Studies with infrastructure improvement analysis
Holmgren [34] inspects the structural vulnerabilities of Power Grids considering the decrease in size of the largest
component of the graph. In particular, the author compares the resilience to failures of the Nordic Grid, the
Western U.S. Grid, a random graph and a Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network. The comparison is considered
both with random node removal and with targeted removal focusing towards nodes with highest node degree and
proceeding in decreasing order; the size of the largest component is the evaluated parameter. The simulation
shows that removing nodes following descending node degree, especially recalculating after each removal, brings
the highest disruption in the network. In particular, the Nordel network seems less robust than U.S. Grid that
in turn performs close to a scale-free network for these targeted attacks. The author also shows the evolution
of the average path length when nodes are randomly removed, highlighting a similar behavior of the U.S. and
Nordic Grids, both dissimilar from the behavior of the Baraba´si-Albert and random graph models. The author
then proposes a virtual scenario of a very simple Grid for which he analyzes different improvement strategies and
different types of potential attacks (both natural circumstances and human-driven sabotages) involving different
type of nodes and edges. The author also shows the decrease in vulnerability that different strategies of network
improvement may bring.
Crucitti et al. in [38] aim to detect the most critical lines for Italian, French and Spanish High Voltage
Grids and to propose solutions to possible vulnerabilities. They use efficiency as main metric to evaluate the
performance of each Grid, that is, a function of the shortest path connecting two nodes. Based on this metric
the vulnerability of the Grid is measured in terms of efficiency loss experienced after a damage is inflicted to the
network. By computing metrics on experimental data, the authors find significant differences between the Grids.
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The Italian Grid is the most vulnerable: by removing just one edge (of course the most critical) the decrease in
efficiency is of 5%, while for the Spanish and the French ones the reduction is only of 3%. With this approach it
is possible to go forward and identify the most critical n-edges that if removed simultaneously decrease efficiency.
The worst case occurs when three lines are removed together as experienced by the Italian Grid whose efficiency
decreases by 31%. In addition, the resulting Grid is then broken into two subgraphs. The authors also consider
the improvements that might be brought by the addition of one new line to the Grid, the Italian Grid is the
one getting the greatest benefits (8% in efficiency increase). The paper also shows the results of the probability
distribution of causing a certain damage (decrease in relative efficiency) for the Grids. The differences in the
shape of the distribution between French, Spanish and the Italian are significant: French and Spanish have a
Gaussian shape, while the Italian damage distribution is bimodal (obtained by the sum of two Gaussian with
different means), in particular, the second peak corresponds to the situations in which the removal of edges brings
to the complete break of the network in two subgraphs.
Rosato et al. [39] use the spectral properties of the Laplacian matrix considering the second smallest eigenvalue
and corresponding eigenvector to identify edges that are extremely critical. For the Italian Grid the authors find
the edges, only three, that if removed break the network apart, while for French and Spanish Grids the value
is seven. This result is in line with the findings described in [38]. The authors also compute the conditional
probability of having a certain number of disconnected nodes from the Grid once a prefixed number of edges is
removed at random. The resulting measure is a sort of robustness index that indicates the level of vulnerability
of the network. The results show the most critical is the Italian Grid for which the removal of just two edges
leads to the probability of disconnecting more than two nodes that is around 5.8%, while for instance the same
situation for the French Grid has only a probability of 0.3%. This is due to the specific morphology of Italy
that spans across a long peninsula. A solution to improve the vulnerabilities of the Italian Grid is to add an
edge between two strategic nodes, then the number of edges to be removed to break apart the network in two
components raises to twelve. In this work, unlike [37], the geographical structure seems to play an important
role and it is a key to understand certain properties.
Brummitt et al. [62] analyze the cascading effect happening on a Power Grid sample of the South-East of
the United States using a sand pile model to generate cascades. In synthesis sand pile model assumes that each
node is characterized by a sand threshold it can support (e.g., maximum load that it can support) and at each
time step a grain of sand is randomly dropped on a node; this added sand can trigger the overtaking of the
threshold for a node which is considered in a failure state and its sand is redistributed among its neighbors. This
redistributed sand (e.g., load) can then trigger other failures in a cascade effect. For more details on the sand
pile model refer to [73, 74]. The analysis in [62] is centered on the effects that connectivity has in networks.
In particular, the authors focus both on randomly generated network, with similar node degree distribution to
real Power Grids and on two real Power Grid, samples. The peculiarity of the samples, which is imposed also
in the synthetically generated networks, is the loose connectivity between the two Grids: the two samples of the
US Grid are actually connected by only 8 edges. The authors find that adding connectivity between the two
loosely connected samples is not always beneficial. In particular, an optimal connectivity exists that minimizes
the chance of cascading spread. Above this threshold of connectivity, cascades, especially of large dimensions,
are likely to spread across the entire connected network. The situation is even more complex when the networks
loosely connected have a disparity in the load they support: for one network more external connectivity would be
beneficial mitigating his internal cascades, while for the other the increased connectivity would pose more threats.
This situation creates the necessity for one Grid to increase its capacity in order to diminish the possibility of
inflicted cascades originating in the neighboring Grid, thus producing a situation of disequilibrium difficult to
solve (e.g., each Grid might aim at achieving his local optimal situation without considering the effects on the
neighbor).
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Summary:
In general, the reliability is assessed by evaluating the connectivity or the abil-
ity to efficiently guarantee paths between nodes when nodes or edges in the
network are removed. As a general result for failures related to nodes all the
samples show a good resilience to random breakdowns. In fact, the network
is always able to guarantee a certain connectivity until the number of nodes
removed are the biggest part of it. On the other hand the Grids are extremely
vulnerable to targeted attacks, that is failures that focus on key nodes for the
entire network such as high degree nodes or nodes with high betweenness or
nodes or lines that manage the highest amount of load or electricity flow. The
thoroughness and space given to the vulnerability and blackout topics in [41]
covering also aspects more related to the electrical domain than pure Complex
Network Analysis, provide a view of the reliability of the power system that is
more precise and complete. This last aspect (i.e., using also physical/electrical
parameters in the analysis) is stressed also in other works [58, 59, 60, 41, 45]
which provide motivations and results justifying the superiority of vulnerability
analyses that have a more realistic view of the Power Grid network. Adding
physical parameters to the network is beneficial to have results concerning the
way networks tend to disrupt and spread failures closer to reality. However, an
aspect that is missing is the cross-check to real problems experienced by the
transmission operators on the lines or nodes of the network identified as most
critical and the resulting cascading effects obtained by a pure topological anal-
ysis or a topological analysis enriched with physical parameters and constraints
characterizing the lines and nodes.
3.7 Further studies
Some of the studies considered in this survey provide additional analyses and investigations that are not common
to any other study and thus deserve special attention. In this subsection we describe the most interesting
additional aspects of some works for the sake of providing a more complete and thorough picture of Complex
Network Analysis approach to the Power Grid.
Mei et al. [41] consider the whole electrical system as a Complex System: a system that is characterized by a
self-organized criticality. The study does not only deal with a pure Complex Network Analysis study (as many of
the other here surveyed), but it provides more insights into the peculiarity of the electrical Grid and systems. In
particular, the book goes further in analyzing and modeling the blackout with particular regard to the dynamical
aspects of the power system such as the power flow distribution and load redistribution. In addition to this
enhanced perspective the book provides a section dedicated to modeling the growth and evolution process of
the High Voltage Power Grid which is a topic which has deserved small attention so far by Complex Network
Analysis studies.
In his statistical analysis of reliability of Europeans Grids Casals [42] goes deeper in analyzing the causes
reported by transmission operators for the failures experienced. The data shows that only about 5% of the failures
are caused by overload of the lines, while about 30% of the failures is classified as “unknown” (the other causes of
problems are categorized as external and failures which correspond respectively to almost 30% and almost 40%).
As remarked by the author this last cause of accidents need to be better understood and categorized in order to
have a better understanding of the phenomena that trigger failures in the Power Grid.
Wang et al. [63] take into account also the electrical properties of the network considering the admittance
matrix expressed as a combination of network adjacency matrix and line impedances. The finding of this study
on line impedances shows for this property a probability distribution with heavy tails (i.e., some long lines
resulting in very high impedance) that is best fitted to a double Pareto lognormal distribution that experiences
an exponential cut-off in the tail part. This is due to economical aspects of construction and maintenance of long
lines. The authors define a model to generate power networks that is based on creating small size sub-networks,
then connect them together in a sort of lattice topology and finally generate the impedances following a certain
distribution (e.g., double Pareto lognormal).
In [40], we point out an important difference resulting in the comparison of the unweighted and weighted
study of the Medium and Low Voltage Power Grid: a general increase in the number of nodes traversed by
following the shortest paths between the unweighted and weighted situation. However, the most interesting part
of the study deals with an integration of all the parameters investigated with the Complex Network Analysis to
provide a measure that associates the topological quantities to the economical aspects that might influence the
spread of a distributed energy exchange market. We combine the topological measures to have two quantities:
one represents the losses experienced in the network (a function of the weighted paths and nodes traveled) and
the other represents the reliability and redundancy of the network (a function of the disruption behavior and of
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the redundancy of available paths). With these indicators we show which network samples are more appealing
for a distributed energy exchange market.
In [75] a mainly modeling study is conducted on the cascading failure behavior of networks whose connectivity
properties are modeled using the principles of percolation theory. The model used does not take into account
real or synthetic Grids to apply the findings, while it bases on the assumption that the Power Grid can be
modeled by a random geometric graph. The aim of the work is to give the analytical conditions (unlike other
works that focus on the empirical application on real or synthetic Power Grid networks) concerning the existence
and non-existence of the largest connected component in a network when subject to link failures which are node
degree dependent. The author proofs under which conditions a cascading failure exists and when links can be
considered vulnerable, reliable and unreliable.
The study of Sun [55] has more the flavor of a survey and a state of the art description than a new analysis.
Pahwa et al. [56], in addition to the vulnerability propose three mitigation strategies in order to improve the
network behavior against cascading effects. 1) a load reduction (by a given percentage) in the load supported
by each node in the network after the initial failure, so that nodes and links operating below maximal capacity
can deal with the redirect load; 2) an idea similar to 1) in the sense of load reduction, but this is applied only
to the nodes along the tree that has his root in the node connected to the faulted line and reaches the leaves
in the path; 3) considers the situation of isolating a cluster of the network in case of a starting cascade event
with the assumption that the cluster can be self-sufficient in terms of energy production (e.g., by using renewable
sources). The results shown are extremely encouraging in both the number of nodes that remain in the network
(that are not involved in the cascade) when the load is preemptively slightly reduced.
For the sake of completeness, we also mention studies about CNA which have a minor focus on the Power
Grid. Most often, the Power Grid is used as a possible example. In particular, Amaral et al. in [76] show a study
of the Southern California Power Grid and the model follows an exponential decay for node degree distribution.
Watts and Strogatz in [1] show the Small-world phenomenon applied to the Western States Power Grid while
Newman, within a more general work [27], shows the exponential node degree distribution for the same Grid as
an example. On the other hand, Barabasi et al. [77] model the Power Grid as a scale-free network characterized
by a Power-law node degree distribution.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
The survey of CNA studies and their comparison shows how important properties of a real system such as
the Power Grid can be studied using graph modeling tools and which conclusions about the reliability of the
infrastructure can be drawn. Complex Network Analysis proofs to be an excellent set of tools that provide,
although without dealing with the details and complexities of the electrical properties in the case of the Power
Grid, a comprehensive and general understanding of the properties that characterize a network. We see an
interesting trend in the various works analyzed, that is, the research towards more complex representation of
the properties of the network than a simple graph. In fact, although Complex Network Analysis can help in
understanding the foundational properties of the network of the Power Grid it is always worth to remember
that the Power Grid is subject to the law of physics and the principles of electrotechnics. From the initial
studies (e.g., [24, 31, 33, 34, 55]) considering the Power Grid just as an indirected graph without any property
(i.e., weight) on edges and with no characterization of the nodes, more recent studies take into account the
electrical properties of the Power Grid system. Of course the aim of these later studies is always to provide
anyway a simplification of the highly complex Power System, but they add those essential parameter to better
simulate the Grid behavior: impedence parameters associated to the transmission lines, power limits supported
by the substations (i.e., nodes) such as for instance in [41, 59, 60, 54, 49]. The inclusion of a more detailed
description of the Power Grid under investigation enables to better understand the dynamics guiding the Power
Grid with a mixed approach: both preserving the idea of the Complex Network Analysis of having a general and
statistical behavior of the overall behavior of the Power Grid, and, on the other hand, to take into account the
physical/electrical properties essential to characterize the Power Grid. Latest results in [60, 59, 58] show a better
agreement to real Power Grid behavior of the models that take into account physical parameters, compared to
the pure topological analysis, and the observed behaviors and critical points in real power systems thus justifying
this enhanced Complex Network Analysis approach.
A noteworthy general aspect is the role that Complex Network Analysis has in the Power Grid infrastructure
vulnerability analysis: CNA does not want to substitute the traditional approaches to Power Systems resilience
and safety analysis since they have proved extremely successful in governing and managing the it with only
occasional highly disruptive events. We stress once again that Complex Network Analysis techniques applied to
the Power Grid world are high simplification of all the complexities governing the Power Systems, but it can
anyway be helpful to give a general vision that can help in identifying quickly and in a simple way critical spots or
aspects of the Power Grid which then may be further and deeply analyzed with traditional electrical engineering
tools.
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A recent emerging function that CNA is acquiring deals with the design aspects of the Power Grid [78]. In
fact, CNA can be used in simulating new Grid topologies, assessing the strategies to evolve actual topologies to
improve them, especially in the panorama of the forthcoming Smart Grid that might require a reshape of the
Grid especially in the Medium and Low Voltage part.
The samples almost entirely belong to the High Voltage network and are part either to the American Grid (or
subsamples of it) or to the European one (or part of it) or Chinese Grid. Generally, the node degree distribution
tends to follow an exponential distribution with some minor exceptions, allowing a general characterization of
the properties of the network by the average degree parameter. Betweenness studies are also interesting to
characterize the criticality of certain nodes as essential for the ability of the network to guarantee its navigability.
Unfortunately, the computation of betweenness is done only by a small part of the studies under assessment.
However, the tendency is to have at least for High Voltage samples a behavior that is closer to a Power-law
distribution for the probability characterizing this metric. It means having very few nodes with very high values
that are responsible to allow the majority of the shortest paths across the network. On the other hand the results
from the different studies contrast regarding the small-world phenomenon in Power Grid networks. Indeed, some
of the conditions imposed by Watts and Strogatz [1] are not met by Power Grid samples due to physical and
economic reasons. This property must depend on the specific sample analyzed. The geography of the country
whose sample is derived is sometimes important (e.g., Italy [39]) while for other studies it has lower impact [37].
A point of agreement between all the studies is about the reliability of the Power Grid networks when facing
failures. A general good resilience to random breakdown, while extreme vulnerability is experienced by attacks
that target the critical nodes (i.e., high node degree or high betweenness nodes).
An important result for the accuracy of the Complex Network Analysis studies is the similarity of results that
this type of analyses give compared to the traditional electrical engineering results [33, 37, 58, 59]. This really
shows how the theoretical study and the measured quantities in the real environment are very close.
Of course to enable Complex Network Analysis to be a more useful tool in the Power Systems domain,
especially in order to create models that take into account the physical parameters of the network data and
information related to the electrical parameters, it is essential for CNA and Power Grid scientists to have precise
and reliable information of the topology and characteristics of the electrical Grid. As remarked by Rosas-
Casals [42] in order to better model and more precisely explain the behavior of the Power Grid, high quality and
precise information are required about the Grids, their components, the actual flow of energy data the Grids deal
with in their operations, the properties of the power lines and also information for those part of the Grid which
are held privately in the hands of Grid operators and distribution operators. Security and criticality of this data
is a recognized aspect in a world that fears terrorist attacks, but without data feeding the models and research
works it is not possible to discover actual vulnerability points and help to build more secure and reliable Power
Grids.
Networks are an integral model of phenomena surrounding us, may these be biological networks (e.g., food-
webs, protein interactions) or human generated ones (e.g., airline travel routes, computer chip wiring, telephone
call graphs) [79]. Having methods and tools to better understand them and their dynamics is beneficial for
knowledge advancement and better design of future systems. Complex Network Analysis is such a modeling
technique that provides methods and metrics for an analytical comprehension of network behaviors. Public
infrastructures are important for today’s society, in particular the Power Grid, which is by nature a complex
network, has a critical role for the economy in every country. Having an overall view of the Power Grid as a
Complex System gives the ability to assess the potential issues the electrical system may face due to topological
failures. In this paper, we have shown what are the main studies conducted on different Power Grid networks
using metrics and techniques from the emerging CNA field of study. Although the basic methodology of study is
the same, indeed the Complex Network Analysis techniques, the results show differences in some properties such
as node degree distribution statistics, the presence or absence of the small-world property. On the other hand, the
commonality is the behavior of the Power Grid networks when facing failures: a general good resilience to random
breakdown, while they show extreme vulnerability when facing attacks that target the critical nodes (i.e., high
degree or high betweenness nodes, nodes or lines that manage the highest electricity flow). The morphology of
the country definitely influences the the topology of the network and thus its properties and reliability, symbolic
is the case of the Italian Grid [39].
To have a more complete idea of the Power Grid networks it is worth investigating other Grids from other
countries, not only limiting oneself to networks in Europe and United States and China as the studies analyzed
so far focus on. The investigation of Grids belonging to other geographies such as Asia and South America could
lead to new topologies. On the other hand, it is important to study more samples belonging to the Medium
and Low Voltage Grids as to the best of our knowledge the only study in this direction is our own [40]. This
is interesting not only because it highlights some different properties from the High Voltage, but also because
it can provide indications useful for the design of the future Smart Grid. The analysis we performed also takes
into account the weights representing physical properties of the Grid and is therefore more informative about
transport capabilities of the distribution network. In addition, Complex Network Analysis can be used not only
as a tool for the analysis of the Grid, but also to consider how the electrical Grid might evolve according to design
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principles to be optimized at a topological level [63, 78]. It is also interesting taking into account the influence
of the network topology on electricity distribution costs for the future scenarios of Smart Grid solutions [40].
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